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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 4968
There is an ongoing debate on whether disasters cause 
significant macroeconomic impacts and are truly a 
potential impediment to economic development. This 
paper aims to assess whether and by what mechanisms 
disasters have the potential to cause significant GDP 
impacts. The analysis first studies the counterfactual 
versus the observed gross domestic product. Second, the 
analysis assesses disaster impacts as a function of hazard, 
exposure of assets, and, importantly, vulnerability. In a 
medium-term analysis (up to 5 years after the disaster 
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World Bank-United Nations’ Assessment of the Economics of Disaster Risk Reduction.. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at hochrain@iiasa.ac.at. We are 
grateful to Apurva Sanghi, Reinhard Mechler and participants of the seminar at the World Bank held on this topic for 
their suggestions and constructive comments.
event), comparing counterfactual with observed gross 
domestic product, the authors find that natural disasters 
on average can lead to negative consequences. Although 
the negative effects may be small, they can become 
more pronounced depending mainly on the size of the 
shock. Furthermore, the authors test a large number of 
vulnerability predictors and find that greater aid and 
inflows of remittances  reduce adverse macroeconomic 
consequences, and that direct losses appear most critical.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A small, but growing literature has emerged over the last few years on the 
macroeconomic and development impacts of natural disasters. Interestingly, there is as 
yet no agreement on whether disasters are important from a macroeconomic perspective, 
and two positions can be identified. The first considers natural disasters a setback for 
economic growth and is well represented by the following citation: 
 
It has been argued that although individuals are risk-averse [to natural disasters risk], 
governments should take a risk-neutral stance. The reality of developing countries suggests 
otherwise. Government decisions should be based on the opportunity costs to society of the 
resources invested in the project and on the loss of economic assets, functions and products. In 
view of the responsibility vested in the public sector for the administration of scarce resources, 
and considering issues such as fiscal debt, trade balances, income distribution, and a wide 
range of other economic and social, and political concerns, governments should not act risk-
neutral (OAS, 1991). 
 
The other position sees disasters as entailing little growth implications and consider 
disasters and their reduction a problem of, but not for development (e.g. Albala-Bertrand, 
1993, 2006; Caselli and Malhotra, 2004). These authors find natural disasters do not 
negatively affect GDP and “if anything, GDP growth is improved” (Albala-Bertrand, 
1993: 207).  This paper can be understood as an attempt at reconciling this body of 
literature. There are two entry points for the analysis. The first is to look at counterfactual 
vs. observed GDP, the second entry point is to assess disaster impacts as a function of 
hazard, exposure of assets (human, produced, intangible), and, importantly vulnerability.  
 Overall, the evidence reveals adverse macroeconomic consequences of disasters on 
GDP. In a medium-term analysis, natural disasters on average seem to lead to negative 
effects on GDP. The negative effects may be small, yet they can become more 
pronounced depending on the size of the shock. We tested a large number of vulnerability 
predictors and found that higher aid rates as well as higher remittances lessen the adverse 
macroeconomic consequences, while capital stock loss is the most important predictor for 
the negative consequences. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the macroeconomic 
impacts of disasters and locates the proposed analysis within the disaster risk 
management paradigm. In section 3, we present the data and methodology used for 
projecting the economic impacts for a medium term horizon (up to 5 years after an 
event), as well as the regression analysis used for identifying predictor variables 
explaining potential impacts. Section 4 ends with a discussion of possible implications of 
our analysis. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on the macroeconomic effects of disasters can be divided into studies 
looking into the short-to-medium term (1-5 years in economic analysis) and the longer 
term (beyond 5 years), with almost all studies taking a shorter-term perspective. A key 
response variable analyzed in this line of work is GDP. In principle, after a disaster event 
the following trajectories may be distinguished (see figure 1) leading to no, positive or 
negative follow-on effects.  
 
 
GDP
Time
Disaster Event
Projected line without 
disaster event
Negative long term
effect
Positive long term
effect
No long term effect
 
 
Fig. 1: Possible trajectories of GDP after a disaster. Source: Hochrainer, 2006 
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Two positions can be distinguished as shown in table 1. Position 1 broadly suggests the 
post-disaster trajectory will fall short of the planned trajectory, while position 2 contends 
that there is no negative effect beyond the first year and the planned GPD path can be 
achieved or even surpassed. 
 
Table 1: Synopsis  of macroeconomic  perspectives  on  natural  disasters 
Position 1 
“Natural disasters are setbacks for 
economic growth” 
Position 2 
“Disasters have no effects on economic 
growth” 
Methodologies involving 
• Supply side focus 
• Model projections 
• Neoclassical intuition 
• Empirical evidence 
 
Studies by Benson (various); ECLAC 
(various); Otero and Marti, 1995; Crowards, 
2000; Charveriat, 2000; Murlidharan and 
Shah, 2001; Freeman et al., 2002; Mechler, 
2004; Cuaresma, Hlouskova, and Obersteiner, 
2004; Hochrainer, 2006; Noy, 2009; 
Okuyama, 2009 
Methodologies involving 
• Supply side and demand side 
• Empirical evidence 
 
 
 
Studies by Albala-Bertrand, 1993, 2006; 
Skidmore and Toya, 2002; Caselli and 
Malhotra, 2004.  
Source: Adapted from Zenklusen, 2007 
 
The body of research subscribing to position 1 generally finds significant short-to-
medium-term macroeconomic effects (Otero and Marti, 1995; Benson, 1997a,b,c; 
Benson, 1998; Benson and Clay, 1998, 2000, 2001; ECLAC 1982, 1985, 1988, 1999, 
2002; Murlidharan and Shah, 2001; Crowards, 2000; Charveriat, 2000; Mechler, 2004; 
Hochrainer, 2006; Noy, 2009) and considers natural disasters a barrier for development 
in disaster-vulnerable developing countries.   
 ECLAC (various studies) has been conducting numerous case studies on disaster 
impacts in Latin American countries since 1972. Otero and Marti (1995) summarized the 
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results and generally found serious shorter-term impacts as national income decreases, an 
increase in the fiscal deficit as tax revenue falls, and an increase in the trade deficit as 
exports fall and imports increase. Substantial longer term impacts on development 
prospects, perpetual external and fiscal imbalances due to increased debt service 
payments post-disaster and spending requirements, and negative effects on income 
distribution were also found (ECLAC and IDB, 2000; Otero and Marti, 1995). They 
generally hold that the significance of the impact depends on the size of the disasters, the 
size of the economy and the prevailing economic conditions (Otero and Marti, 1995). 
Benson (1997a,b,c) and Benson and Clay (1998, 2000, 2001) produced a number of case 
studies on Fiji, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Dominica. The timeframe of this analysis 
was mainly short-term, i.e. the period up to one year after a disaster. They detected severe 
negative economic impacts, with agriculture being hit most strongly, an exacerbation of 
inequalities, and reinforcement of poverty, however also finding it difficult to isolate 
disaster impacts on economic variables from other impacts. Murlidharan and Shah (2001) 
by means of a regression analysis analyzed a large data set of 52 catastrophes in 32 
developed and developing countries with a the short-term focus (year before event 
compared to year of event). They found catastrophes for all country income groups to 
affect short-term growth very significantly. In the medium-term (average of two 
preceding years compared to average of event and two following years), the effect on 
growth was still significant. Over time, they detected impact on economic growth to 
subside. They also discovered associations between disasters and the growth of external 
debt, the budget deficit and inflation. Crowards (1999 discussed in Charveriat, 2000) 
examined the impacts of 22 hurricane events in borrowing member countries of the 
Caribbean Development Bank and found that GDP growth slowed by 3% points on 
average post-event, but rebounded due to the increase in investment the following year. 
He also detected large variations around averages.2
                                                          
2  This study could not be obtained and we rely on Charveriat (2000) as a secondary source. 
 Charveriat (2000) for most cases in 
her disaster sample identified a typical pattern of GDP with a decrease in the year of an 
event and a recuperation of the growth rate in the following two years due to high 
investment into fixed capital. She detected the scale of short-term impacts to depend on 
the loss-to-GDP-ratio and whether the event was localized or country-wide. For high-
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loss-to-GDP ratios and country-wide events she found larger impacts. She found the 
following crucial variables affecting the scale of aggregate effects: structure of the 
economy and general conditions prevailing, the size of economy, the degree of 
diversification and the speed of assistance of the international community. Another study, 
Rasmussen (2004), is in accordance with above studies and for a cross-country sample 
identified a median reduction of the growth rate by 2.2% points in the year of the event. 
Raddatz (2007) generally assessed the role of external shocks (such as commodity price 
fluctuations, natural catastrophe, and adverse influences from an international economic 
environment) on output volatility of low-income countries. While he found external 
shocks to explain a fraction of output variance, their contribution to output fluctuations 
was dwarfed by more important contributors from internal sources such as level of 
inflation, a possible overvaluation of the real exchange rate and large public deficits. Noy 
(2009) took a look at the reduction of GDP growth rates for a large sample of disaster 
events, for which while using a linear regression modeling approach he concluded that 
the ability to mobilize resources for reconstruction as well as the financial condition of 
the country are important predictors of GDP growth effects. As one of the few longer 
term studies, Cuaresma et al. (2004) concluded that the degree of catastrophic risk has a 
negative effect on knowledge spillovers between industrialized and developing countries. 
Further, they suggested that only countries with relatively high levels of development 
may benefit from capital upgrading through trade after a natural catastrophe.  
 There are only a few studies adopting position 2 and the key papers here are Albala-
Bertrand (1993) and to a lesser extent Caselli and Malhotra (2004).  In (partial) contrast 
to the above studies, Albala-Bertrand (1993) came to different conclusions and finds 
himself partially in opposition to accepted views when analyzing impacts mainly on 
developing countries. He first statistically analyzed part of the ECLAC data set discussed 
above and found that natural disasters do not negatively affect GDP, public deficit and 
inflation in the short to medium term. His findings on the trade deficit are in accordance 
with ECLAC and other research. These findings he explains with a sharp increase in 
capital inflows and transfers (private and public donations). He holds that natural 
disasters do not lower GDP growth rates and "if anything, they might improve them" 
(1993: 207). Albala-Bertrand also examined longer-term effects for a number of 
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developed and developing countries and found no significant long-term effects in 
developed countries; he came to the conclusion that in developing countries aggregate 
effects fade away after two years, but that some negative effects on income distribution 
and equality persist. Overall, Albala-Bertrand considered disasters "a problem of 
development, but essentially not a problem for development." (Albala-Bertrand 1993). 
According to his analysis, while the number of deaths and people affected and the extent 
of monetary losses are determined by the current state of a country's development, 
disasters do not normally hinder long-term development, with the sole exception being 
widespread droughts.3
                                                          
3 Albala-Bertrand (1993) started fruitful discussions about some assumptions and estimating issues in the 
literature, and his findings were discussed and replicated by various other authors including Mechler 
(2004) and Hochrainer (2006). For example, Hochrainer (2006) extended Albala-Bertrand’s sample to 
85 disaster events in 45 countries and found GDP growth (on average) negatively affected in the disaster 
year and no significant increases in growth for the subsequent post-disaster years, which implies that, 
due to a lack of recovery, a net loss of GDP. 
 Further, Caselli and Malhotra (2004) based their analysis on 
neoclassical growth theory and analyzed the losses in relation to country growth rates 
after disaster events using a dataset of 172 countries for events between 1975 and 1996.  
They concluded that their hypothesis that losses of labor and capital stock have no effect 
on short-term economic growth could not be rejected. Finally, Skidmore and Toya (2002) 
discovered a robust positive correlation between the frequency of natural disasters and 
long-run economic growth after conditioning for other determinants, which they explain 
by some type of Schumpeterian creative destruction.  
 Overall, while the balance of evidence and studies seems to imply that there are 
adverse economic disaster effects in terms of the “negative” trajectory stylized above, 
there are important “outliers” that merit more investigation. Another observation is that 
the studies generally have a short-term focus, and in their analyses often do not go 
beyond the year following an event. Finally, analyses generally compare key indicators of 
interest after the fact to their pre-disaster states, rather than comparing the counterfactual, 
i.e. the system without a shock, to the observed. The latter point seems important, as 
important opportunity costs, e.g. in terms of economic growth foregone, are consequently 
often not accounted for in analyses on the macro effects of disasters. 
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2.1 Economic effects and vulnerability  
 
In order to set the stage for the analyses, we hold it important to locate the discussion 
within the disaster risk management framework. The standard approach here is to 
understand natural disaster risk as a function of hazard, exposure and (physical) 
vulnerability (see figure 2). Hazard analysis entails determining the type of hazards 
affecting a certain area with specific intensity and recurrence. Assessing exposure 
involves analyzing the relevant elements (population, assets) exposed to relevant hazards 
in a given area. Vulnerability is a multidimensional concept encompassing a large 
number of factors that can be grouped into physical, economic, social and environmental 
factors as outlined on the figure. We refer mostly to physical vulnerability as the 
susceptibility to incurring harm of people and engineered structures leading to direct risk 
in terms of people affected and, important from the perspective taken in this paper, 
capital stock destroyed. As a consequence of such direct impacts, follow-on effects may 
materialize leading to indirect potential and actual impacts. Economic vulnerability may 
refer to the economic or financial capacity to absorb disaster events, e.g. the ability to 
refinance asset losses and to recover quickly to a previously planned economic growth 
path. It may relate to private households and businesses as well as governments, the latter 
often bearing a large share of a country’s risk and losses. Based on assessments of 
disaster risks and its determinants, risk management measures may be systematically 
planned for risk reduction and risk transfer. 
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Fig. 2: Conceptual framework used in this study for explaining economic risk due to natural 
disasters 
 
The literature on the economic impacts discussed above can be related to this framework, 
and table 2 lists the key studies and general factors contributing to a discussion of 
(macro) economic risk. Determinants of impacts and risk can be distinguished according 
to (i) the type of natural hazard (hazard variable), (ii) geographical area and spatial scale 
of impact (exposure), (iii) the overall structure of the economy, (iv) the stage of 
development of the country, (v) prevailing socio-economic conditions, and (vi) the 
availability of formal and informal mechanisms to share risks (the latter four variables 
related to economic vulnerability).4
                                                          
4 It should be mentioned that in the studies discussed and our analysis, observed losses are used 
for examining future economic consequences. However, when it comes to risk management, 
losses should be based on probabilities and the discussion framed in terms of risk in order the 
incorporate the full possible range of potential losses (and its probabilities) in the analysis. 
  
 
Hazard Exposure Physical 
Vulnerability 
Direct losses (risk) 
      Produced capital 
      Human capital 
      Environmental capital 
Socio-economic vulnerability 
Risk Management 
Economic 
Consequences 
GDP 
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Table 2: Studies assessing macroeconomic consequences and economic vulnerability 
to natural hazards.  
Study Vulnerability variables for predicting 
economic impacts and risk 
Response variables 
Charveriat, 2000 
 
• Size of the economy, degree of 
diversification and size of the 
informal and agricultural sectors.  
• GDP 
ECLAC and IDB, 
2000; 
Freeman et al. 
2002; 
Mechler,2004; 
Hochrainer, 2006 
• Ability to refinance losses and 
provide relief to the affected 
population (financial vulnerability)  
• Availability of implicit (aid) and 
explicit (insurance)  risk sharing 
arrangements  
• GDP, fiscal variables 
Burton et al.,1993; 
Kahn, 2005. 
• Income • Deaths due to natural 
disasters 
Benson and Clay,  
2004 
• Structure of the economy 
• Size 
• Income level and stage of 
development 
• Prevailing socioeconomic conditions 
• Total GDP annual change 
• Agricultural GDP annual 
change 
• Non-Agric. GDP annual 
change 
Toya and 
Skidmore, 2007 
• Educational attainment in population 
aged 15 and over 
• Economic openness 
(exports+imports)/GDP 
• Financial sector level of development 
(M3/GDP) 
• Government consumption 
• Additional variables that determine 
the deaths caused by disasters 
(population, land area, disaster type). 
• Disaster-related deaths 
• Damages/GDP 
Noy, 2009 • Literacy rate 
• Quality of institutions 
• Per capita income 
• Openness to trade 
• Levels of government spending 
• Foreign exchange reserves 
• Levels of domestic credit  
• Openness of capital accounts 
• GDP 
Raschky, 2008 • Availability of financial risk sharing 
institutions 
• GDP 
Source: extended from Barrito, 2008. 
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All of the indicators used for explaining the response variables mentioned above are valid 
candidates as proxies for hazard, exposure and vulnerability and most of them will be 
used in the analysis in the next section. 
 
3 ASSESSING ECONOMIC DISASTER CONSEQUENCES AND RISK  
 
In order to identify the macroeconomic effects of disasters, we suggest comparing a 
counterfactual situation ex-post to the observed state of the system ex-post. This involves 
assessing the potential trajectory (projected unaffected economy without disaster) versus 
the observed state of the economy. This contrasts with observing economic performance 
post-event and actual performance pre-event, as usually done in similar analysis. Our 
analysis requires projecting economic development into a future without an event. The 
approach is illustrated via the case of Honduras, which was heavily hit by Hurricane 
Mitch at the end of 1998. In figure 3 absolute GDP with the event and projected GDP 
without an event were estimated. The chart exhibits GDP growth to become negative in 
the year after, then rebound later; yet, overall the net effect would seem to be a loss. 
 
GDP in Honduras
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Fig. 3: Observed GDP in Honduras with events vs. projected growth without events. Source: 
Zapata, 2008; World Bank, 2007; own calculations 
Note: Zapata  (2008) uses a model based projection, IIASA projects growth statistically based on 
pre-disaster observed GDP. 
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Using this approach for Honduras, a “GDP gap” as a follow-on consequence after the 
hurricane can be identified. For example, in 2004, about 6 years after the event, this gap 
can be considered to have, ceteris paribus, amounted to about 6% of potential GDP given 
extrapolation of pre-disaster GDP with a 4-year average growth rate, and to 8.6% percent 
based on the ECLAC projection.  
 In the following, similarly we compare GDP effects in terms of counterfactual vs. 
observed trajectories by projecting absolute GDP into the future under the assumption of 
a no disaster event scenario and comparing it with observed GDP values. A 5 year time 
horizon is chosen as it is the minimum data requirement for estimating time series 
projections into the future and reflects the trade-off between data requirements and 
number of samples (the larger the sample the lower the time horizon). There are two 
avenues for deriving the counterfactual: (i) running a (statistical or behavioral) economic 
model without a disaster event, for which a large number of models calibrated to the 
respective countries would be necessary; (2) using time series models. We adopt the 
second option to eliminate as much possible business cycles in the dataset. We use 
econometric models which seem to be able to handle empirically observed patterns, 
which is important as a large number of the countries examined are of developing nature 
and exhibit strong growth volatility.  
3.1 Estimation methodology 
 
We use autoregressive integrated moving average models, also called ARIMA(p,d,q) 
(Box and Jenkins, 1976) for forecasting GDP into the future after the disaster event. 
ARIMA modeling approaches are chosen because they are sufficiently general to handle 
virtually all empirically observed patterns and often used for GDP forecasting (see for 
example Abeysinghe and Rajaguru, 2004). While such a type of modeling may be 
criticized for its black box approach (Makridakis and Wheelwright, 1989), it here serves 
well due to the large number of projections to be made and the difficulty identifying 
suitable economic model approaches, such as input-output models for all the different 
countries within the sample and over a time period starting from 1965. 
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The ARIMA process 
Recall, an autoregressive process of order AR(p) can be defined as 
tptp2t21t1t xxxx ε+φ++φ+φ= −−−   
 
A moving-average process of order MA(q) may be written as 
 
 
and an ARMA(p,q) process, with p autoregressive and q moving average terms can  be 
defined to be 
qtqttptxptxtx −++−++−++−= εθεθεφφ  1111  
 
where φ  and θ  are parameters to be estimated and ε  are white noise stochastic error 
terms. Now, let ty  be a non-stationary series and define the first order regular difference 
of  ty  as 
1−−=∆ tytyty  
 
or more generally using a back-shift operator denoted as ktztz
kB −=   
ty
dBty
d )1( −=∆  
 
An ARIMA(p,d,q) model can then be expressed as 
tBqty
dBBp εθφ )()1)(( =−  
 
with 
pBpBBp φφφ −−−= 11)(  
and 
qBqBBq θθθ −−−= 11)(  
 
qtqttttx −++−+−+= εθεθεθε 2211
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The Box-Jenkins methodology (Box and Jenkins, 1976) is applied for determining the 
components of the ARIMA process; i.e. we test different ARIMA(p,d,q) models with p 
and q to be smaller or equal 4 (due to the limited amount of data) and estimate φ  and θ  
using Maximum likelihood techniques and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as 
well as diagnostic checks to detect a suitable model. The data requirements were set thus 
that at least 5 observed data points are needed for projections into the future. This is the 
smallest number of observations which are needed to estimate ARIMA(4,1,4) models 
(however, the majority of the sample (greater 90 percent) has at least 10 data points). 
Furthermore, all models are tested to be stationary (usually d=1 suffices to assure a 
stationary process) and all series are demeaned. To include uncertainty in the projections, 
also 95 percent confidence forecasts were calculated and analyzed.  
Forecasts into the future are performed with the selected models and then compared 
to the observed variables. Increases or decreases of GDP in future years are measured as 
a percentage increase or decrease to baseline GDP (i.e., baseline =100) which is defined 
to be GDP a year before the disaster event. 5
3.2 Data used 
 Furthermore, the differences between 
observed values and projected ones are calculated and called Diff(t), which indicates the 
percentage difference between the observed and projected value of GDP in year t. We 
focus on projections with a medium term perspective (up to 5 years into the future). This 
limitation is due to important data constraints for the ARIMA models within the sample 
and increasingly large uncertainties beyond the medium-term time horizon. 
Our sample consists of 225 large natural disaster events during 1960-2005. The sample is 
based on information from two databases and was compiled by Okuyama (2009) with the 
threshold for a large event defined arbitrarily to a loss exceeding 1 percent of GDP.6
                                                          
5 To decrease variance a logarithmic transformation of GDP was performed at the beginning. 
6 In order to define the “event set” the threshold of stock losses is set as a share (1%) of flow effects (GDP). 
While it would have been more systematic to define an asset threshold, yet we responded to the larger 
intuitive appeal of using GDP as a denominator, and the fact that this threshold was also used by another 
paper in the EDRR working paper series which we wanted to be in line with. 
 One 
database is the open-source EMDAT disaster database (CRED, 2008) maintained by the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Université Catholique de 
Louvain. EMDAT currently lists information on people killed, made homeless, affected 
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and financial losses for more than 16,000 sudden-onset (such as floods, storms, 
earthquakes) and slow-onset (drought) events from 1900 to present. Primary data are 
compiled for various purposes, such as informing relief and reconstruction requirements 
internationally or nationally, and data are generally collected from various sources and, 
including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research 
institutes and press agencies. The other database is the proprietary Munich Re NatCat 
Service database, which mainly serves to inform insurance and reinsurance pricing.  
This database contains fewer entries focusing on the about 300 largest events since 1950, 
yet data exhibit a higher reliability as often crosschecked with other information. We 
focus on the monetary losses (direct impacts or risk) listed in constant 2000 USD terms. 
In both datasets, loss data follow no uniform definition and are collected for different 
purposes such as assessing donor needs for relief and reconstruction, assessing potential 
impacts on economic aggregates and defining insurance losses. We distinguish between 
sudden and slow onset events. Key sudden-onset events are extreme geotectonic events 
(earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, slow mass movements) and extreme weather events 
such as tropical cyclones, floods and winter storms. Slow-onset natural disasters are 
either of a periodically recurrent or permanent nature; these are droughts and 
desertification.  
We broadly associate the loss data with asset losses, i.e. damages to produced 
capital. This is a simplification, as indirect impacts, such as business interruption, may 
also be factored into the data. Yet, generally, at least for the sudden onset events, analysts 
generally equate the data with asset losses, and an indication that this assumption can be 
maintained is the fact that loss data are usually relatively quickly available after a 
catastrophe, which indicates that flow impacts emanating over months to years are 
usually not considered. Losses are compared to estimates of capital stock from Sanderson 
and Striessnig (2009), which estimated stocks using the perpetual inventory method 
based on Penn World table information on investments starting in 1900 and assuming 
annual growth and depreciation of 4 percent. 
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3.3 Projecting disaster impacts on GDP 
We project differences (in percent) between observed and projected GDP up to five years 
after a disaster event. A negative value indicates a situation where the projection 
surpasses the observation leading to a negative effect. Figure 4 charts out these 
differences for the years 1 to 5. Due to the heterogeneity of the data, it is not very 
surprising that the results are heavily skewed and as an average value the median should 
be looked at. 
 
Difference 
(Year 1)
Difference 
(Year 2)
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(Year 3)
Difference 
(Year 4)
Difference 
(Year 5)
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Fig. 4: Box-plots for differences between observed and projected GDP (in percent of 
observed, baseline GDP in the event year) 
 
The mean, median, standard deviation as well as the skewness coefficients for the whole 
sample are shown in table 3.  
Table 3: Summary results for differences of observed and projected GDP levels 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Mean -1.27 -1.43 -1.68 -1.75 -2.02 
Median -0.53 -1.03 -1.86 -2.27 -3.98 
Std. Dev 7.19 11.01 14.99 18.37 22.53 
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Skewness -1.54 -0.76 -0.13 0.42 0.98 
 
According to the skewness and standard deviation the results are asymmetric with a large 
spread. The results, however, clearly indicate a trend. All post-disaster years show 
negative values with an increasing “gap,”  indicating that “on average” one can expect 
negative economic follow-on consequences in the short-medium term, leading to a 
median reduction of GDP of about 4% points (of baseline GDP in to) in year 5 after the 
event.  
We further test whether the differences are statistically different from zero and, 
due to non-normality of the data, used the non-parametric one-sample Wilcoxon test 
(table 4). The null hypothesis H0 is that the median is equal to zero, while the alternative 
hypothesis H1 is that the median is smaller than zero. Table 4 shows the p-values for this 
test using the (mean) projections. 
 
Table 4: p-values of the Wilcoxon test for differences to be smaller than zero (H1) and 
H0: equal to zero. 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
p-value  0.0138 0.0379 0.0258 0.0171 0.0129 
Hypothesis H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 
 
Clearly, the null hypothesis is rejected for all post-disaster years, and therefore one can 
conclude that there are significant negative follow-on effects. Furthermore, also 95 
percent forecast confidence intervals to include uncertainty of the projections within the 
analysis are used. Additionally, also sub-sample analysis to include uncertainty regarding 
the influence of multiple occurrences of disasters is performed. The sub-sample is chosen 
so that only events are considered with no other event (with losses higher than 1 percent 
of GDP) occurring 5 years before and 5 years after the event considered in the sample. 
Results related to this sub-sample corroborate our findings on the negative economic 
consequences (details can be found in Appendix D). 
3.4 Explaining the variation: vulnerability predictors  
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As a next step, we test key variables, particularly those relating to economic 
vulnerability, as to their suitability as predictors for explaining the differences of 
projected and observed GDP in year 5 post event. Based on the literature review and 
discussion above, the following variables listed in table 5 are assessed.  
Table 5: Predictor variables used in the analysis7
Predictors 
 
Variables Source 
Direct impact and risk Direct monetary losses EMDAT, 2009, Munich Re, 
2008 as compiled by 
Okuyama, 2009 
Losses in percent of GDP Okuyama, 2009 
Losses in percent of capital stock Own calculations 
Exposure GDP WDI, 2008 
Capital stock Sanderson and Striessnig, 2009 
Total number of population WDI, 2008 
Hazard Hazard type: 
Storm, Flood, Earthquake,  
Drought, others 
EMDAT, 2008 
Munich Re, 2008 
Economic vulnerability Indebtedness WDI, 2008 
Income level WDI, 2006 
Land area WDI, 2008 
Literacy rate WDI, 2008 
Aid  WDI, 2008 
Remittances WDI, 2008 
Small island development state 
(SIDS) 
WDI, 2008 
 
In the following, we first use multivariate models, then employ general linear regression 
modeling approaches (GLM) using fixed factors, covariates and mixed models as 
independent variables and Diff(5) as the dependent variable.  
                                                          
7 We did not look at physical vulnerability factors (for example, the quality of building stock in an 
economy) as predictors, as those do not seem to be of importance in isolation and are accounted for in 
the direct impact variable. 
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First, exploratory analyses are performed (see tables A-1). Pearson correlation 
analysis (which assumes a linear relationship) between the continuous variables and 
Diff(5) leads to (highly) significant results with (log) capital stock losses (correlation of -
0.317, p-value 0.000). Interestingly, such a correlation cannot be found for GDP losses, 
indicating that capital stock losses may serve as a better predictor. Furthermore, total 
population (correlation of 0.200, p-value 0.013) as well as aid (in percent of capital 
formation) are found to be significant (correlation of 0.187, p-value 0.032).  
Descriptive statistics for Diff(5) within sub-groups according to the income, 
indebtedness, SIDS and hazard type indicators  are considered next (see tables A-2 to A-
6). Using the income indicator, the mean of Diff(5) for all sub-groups exhibits negative 
values. Also, with regards to the indebtedness indicator, there are negative mean 
(median) values. As to the type of hazard, storms and earthquakes as well as droughts (if 
the median is looked at) show negative values. In addition, additional “layers” (or sub-
sub groups) are examined; however, the number of observations quickly becomes very 
small, and therefore average values should be treated with caution. Results of Diff(5) for 
the interaction of two indicators (which means 6 possible sub-groups) can be found in 
tables A-6 to A-11. For example, low income in combination with high indebtedness 
leads to more pronounced negative consequences. Overall, however, a general 
interpretation of these results is difficult as no clear trend can be discerned. Therefore, we 
use regression models in the following. 
 
Multivariate regression model  
 
A forward stepwise regression procedure to detect the most important independent 
variables from table 5 for the dependent variable Diff(5) is employed. In the first round of 
the iteration, the independent variables are each added to the starting model (i.e. intercept 
only model), and the improvement in the residual sum of squares for each of these 
resulting models is calculated. Next, for each model the p-value for the change in the sum 
of squares is determined (based on the F-distribution). The variable associated with the 
lowest p-value is the first model candidate. If the p-value is below 0.1 (significance at the 
10% level), then this model is taken. In the next round, this model will be the starting 
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model and the subsequent rounds follow the same procedure as the first. The forward 
procedure stops if the lowest candidate p-value in subsequent rounds is not lower than 
0.1. Table 6 lists the initial model 1 and the final model 2 (all output tables for the full 
regression model can be found in Appendix B).  
 
Table 6: Multivariate Regression results using a forward algorithm( Model=1: 
Starting model, Model=2: Final model) 
Model Coefficients 
(Unstandardized) 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t 
 
p-value 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 Constant 
       Percent of Capital    
             stock loss (log) 
3.254 
-4.600 
3.247 
2.076 
 
-0.317 
1.002 
-2.216 
0.322 
0.032 
2 Constant 
           Percent of Capital      
                 stock loss (log) 
            Remittances 
-3.095 
-5.934 
 
1.946 
4.276 
2.086 
 
0.897 
 
-0.409 
 
0.312 
-0.724 
-2.844 
 
2.170 
0.473 
0.007 
 
0.036 
 
The final regression model is already reached at step 2, which indicates that the selected 
variables already have good predictive power. Regarding the fit of the model, while not 
very satisfactory from a predictive point of view (R square is around 19 percent), two 
variables are significant at the 5 percent level: capital stock losses (p 0.007) and 
remittances in the disaster year (p 0.036). While the capital stock loss variable has a 
negative coefficient suggesting a larger direct shock will lead also to larger negative GDP 
effects, the remittances parameter has a positive value suggesting that stronger 
remittances inflow will decrease negative consequences. In line with the exploratory 
analysis, the direct impacts variable (capital stock losses) seems to be a strong predictor.  
To summarize, the size of the direct impact (losses) strongly predicts the magnitude 
of follow-on effects. The fact that it significantly explains the variation in Diff(5), which 
is based on the time series approach, seems to suggest some validity of the regression 
results so far. However, interdependencies between variables are not used in this model 
and are looked at next. 
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General linear regression model  
 
A general linear regression modeling approach8, which also allows for inclusion of 
interdependencies of several indicator variables, is used next. The model is restricted to 
selected key variables first identified in the literature review, the further limited by the 
exploratory analysis (partly presented already in the tables). The model has 4 fixed 
factors (indicators), including country income group, indebtedness, countries relating to 
SIDS and hazard type (see table 7).9
Table 7: Indicators used for the GLM regression 
  
 
Name [abbreviation] 
 
 
Value Label 
 
Observations 
 
Income [I_Income] 
high income 19 
middle income 96 
low income 46 
 
Indebtedness [debt] 
Nan 20 
less indebted 59 
medium indebted 18 
highly indebted 62 
 
SIDS [I_SIDS] 
Yes 41 
No 118 
 
 
Hazard [I_Hazard] 
Storm 55 
Flood 41 
Earthquake 26 
Drought 24 
Other 13 
 
                                                          
8 GLM underlies most of the statistical analyses used in applied and social research due to its widespread 
applicability. With general linear models many statistical tests can be handled as a regression analysis, 
including t-tests and ANOVA (Analysis of Variance). 
9 The covariates (continuous variables) are chosen based on table 2 and full order effects up to 
level 2 are included, i.e. relationships between up to two fix factors (indicators) and one 
covariate are explored within the model. 
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We thus define different sub-samples according to these indicator variables. For example, 
the whole sample can be split by the income group indicator into 3 sub-samples, the high 
income sub-sample (19 observations), the middle (94 observations) and low income sub-
samples (46 observations). As mentioned, the limitation of higher order effects is mainly 
due to the decreasing number of observations within sub-groups.  Table 8 shows the tests 
for the different main factors as well as their interactions with the indicators.10
Table 8: GLM Findings: tests of between-subjects effects 
 Full 
output details can be found in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: Difference (year 5)
21220a 40 531 6.446 .023
1337 1 1337 16.243 .010
244 1 244 2.969 .145
13 1 13 .162 .704
764 1 764 9.284 .029
1802 1 1802 21.888 .005
2230 1 2230 27.093 .003
1849 1 1849 22.467 .005
20 1 20 .238 .646
80 1 80 .971 .370
0 1 0 .003 .956
4108 2 2054 24.959 .003
1 1 1 .008 .931
97 1 97 1.174 .328
965 1 965 11.723 .019
653 1 653 7.932 .037
4155 8 519 6.310 .029
369 1 369 4.483 .088
106 1 106 1.291 .307
245 3 82 .991 .468
727 2 364 4.418 .079
698 1 698 8.475 .033
5 1 5 .063 .812
1805 4 451 5.482 .045
82 1 82 .998 .364
140 1 140 1.706 .248
63 2 31 .381 .702
0 0 . . .
0 0 . . .
0 0 . . .
412 5 82
22969 46
21632 45
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Literacy rate
Aid (capital formation)
Aid (percent of import and exports)
Capital Stock loss (log) [logCapLoss]
Aid (percent of GNI)
Remittances [Remit]
Capital Stock (log)
GDP (log)
Land Area (log)
I_debt * Remit
I_Income * Remit
I_SIDS * Remit
I_debt * I_Income * Remit
I_debt * I_SIDS * Remit
I_debt * I_Hazard * Remit
I_Income * I_SIDS * Remit
I_Income * I_Hazard * Remit
I_SIDS * I_Hazard * Remit
I_debt * logCapLoss
I_Income * logCapLoss
I_SIDS * logCapLoss
I_Hazard * logCapLoss
I_debt * I_Income * logCapLoss
I_debt * I_SIDS * logCapLoss
I_debt * I_Hazard * logCapLoss
I_Income * I_SIDS * logCapLoss
I_Income * I_Hazard * logCapLoss
I_SIDS * I_Hazard * logCapLoss
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type I Sum of
Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig.
R Squared = .981 (Adjusted R Squared = .829)a. 
 
 
                                                          
10 A least squares criterion is used to obtain estimates of the parameters models. 
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As to the model specification (table 8 bottom), the model itself is significant (p-value 
0.021) with about 83 percent of the variation explained (R-square 0.829), which is quite 
satisfactory. Significant variables (p-value smaller than 0.05) include  aid (in percent of 
import and exports), capital stock loss (logged), aid (in percent of GNI), remittances, and 
interactions of capital stock losses and remittances with some of the other indicators, such 
as indebtedness, income and hazard.  
The parameter estimates in Appendix C for the dependent variables cannot be used 
for interpretation purposes, because GLM models usually have systematic colinearity 
between the dependent variables and therefore the impact of one single dependent 
variable is not captured within the parameter estimate. Hence, the variables found to be 
significant in table 8 are analyzed according to scatter-plots, profile plots as well as 
comparisons of averages. In line with the observations made above the results lead to the 
conclusion that especially the direct impact, measured in percent of capital stock loss 
leads to negative long-term consequences. Remittances as well as various forms of aid 
decrease the negative effects, however, not as strongly as direct losses. Unfortunately, it 
has not been possible to refine the analysis with further sub-sub groups, such as looking 
at country debt levels which seems promising, as the number of observations became too 
small. Overall, we also find that in general natural disasters can be expected to entail 
negative consequences in the medium term (five years after an event). As in the 
multivariate regression, adverse macroeconomic effects can be related to the direct 
impact in terms of asset losses. Higher aid rates as well as higher remittances (pre-
disaster) seem important in lessening the adverse macroeconomic consequences. 
 
4 DISCUSSION  
 
There is an ongoing debate on whether disasters cause significant macroeconomic 
impacts and are truly a potential impediment to economic development. Given the 
divergent positions, this analysis aimed at better defining a sort of “middle ground” 
identifying circumstances under which disasters have the potential to cause significant 
medium-term economic impacts. In a medium-term analysis, comparing counterfactual 
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GDP derived by time series analysis with observed GDP, natural disasters on average 
lead to significant negative effects on GDP. The negative effects may be small, yet can 
become more pronounced depending on the direct impact measured as a loss of capital 
stock. Using regression analysis, we further test a large number of predictors and find that 
higher aid rates as well as higher remittances importantly lessen the adverse negative 
macroeconomic consequences, while direct capital stock losses had the largest effects in 
causing adverse GDP effects. A number of other variables, such as country debt, seemed 
promising in terms of explaining the variability of GDP, yet it was not possible to further 
refine the analysis due to small number of observations. Beyond these findings, final 
conclusions are difficult to draw and the uncertainty in loss data and socioeconomic 
information has to be acknowledged. One reason is the challenge associated with 
determining the size and type of impacts as well as identifying additional key predictors. 
For example, particularly for middle and high income countries, capital stock losses 
probably play a minor role and other variables such as human and natural capital 
increasingly become important. Obvious steps for improving the analysis should thus 
focus on increasing the sample size and quality of data generated, particularly as relates 
to those lower income and hazard-prone countries supposed to be most vulnerable and of 
highest interest for the analysis. Finally, another key extension of the analysis would be 
to also look at disaster impacts on human and environmental capital and its economic 
repercussions, in isolation as well as in conjunction with produced capital. 
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table A-1: Correlation matrix 
Correlations
1 -.105 .051 -.128 -.142 -.184* .200* .098 -.092
.195 .528 .117 .083 .025 .013 .388 .653
155 155 155 150 150 149 155 80 26
-.105 1 -.102 -.052 .261** .334** -.099 .093 -.065
.195 .131 .466 .000 .000 .152 .338 .689
155 220 220 199 199 193 210 108 40
.051 -.102 1 .242** .174* -.025 .693** .107 -.035
.528 .131 .001 .014 .728 .000 .269 .832
155 220 220 199 199 193 210 108 40
-.128 -.052 .242** 1 .422** .014 .101 .084 -.066
.117 .466 .001 .000 .846 .156 .399 .692
150 199 199 199 199 193 199 102 39
-.142 .261** .174* .422** 1 .948** .035 .073 -.071
.083 .000 .014 .000 .000 .628 .463 .666
150 199 199 199 199 193 199 102 39
-.184* .334** -.025 .014 .948** 1 -.023 .017 -.057
.025 .000 .728 .846 .000 .749 .864 .734
149 193 193 193 193 193 193 99 38
.200* -.099 .693** .101 .035 -.023 1 .028 -.044
.013 .152 .000 .156 .628 .749 .776 .789
155 210 210 199 199 193 210 105 40
.098 .093 .107 .084 .073 .017 .028 1 .112
.388 .338 .269 .399 .463 .864 .776 .629
80 108 108 102 102 99 105 108 21
-.092 -.065 -.035 -.066 -.071 -.057 -.044 .112 1
.653 .689 .832 .692 .666 .734 .789 .629
26 40 40 39 39 38 40 21 40
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Difference (year 5)
Loss in percent of GDP
Capital Stock
GDP
Loss in monetary terms
Loss in percent of
Capital Stock
Total Population
Literacy rate (percent of
adult)
Government Aid
Difference
(year 5)
Loss in
percent of
GDP Capital Stock GDP
Loss in
monetary
terms
Loss in
percent of
Capital Stock
Total
Population
Literacy rate
(percent of
adult)
Government
Aid
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**.  
 
Table A-1: Correlation matrix (continued) 
Correlations
1 .187* .132 .118 -.149 -.317** .061 .107
.032 .162 .143 .064 .000 .494 .277
155 132 113 155 155 149 130 106
.187* 1 .763** -.171* .034 -.034 .813** .009
.032 .000 .025 .661 .668 .000 .921
132 171 133 171 171 160 161 122
.132 .763** 1 -.147 .052 .049 .636** .041
.162 .000 .081 .540 .572 .000 .656
113 133 142 142 142 133 136 121
.118 -.171* -.147 1 -.203** -.338** -.137 -.195*
.143 .025 .081 .002 .000 .065 .016
155 171 142 220 220 193 183 152
-.149 .034 .052 -.203** 1 .714** .208** .355**
.064 .661 .540 .002 .000 .005 .000
155 171 142 220 220 193 183 152
-.317** -.034 .049 -.338** .714** 1 .100 .210*
.000 .668 .572 .000 .000 .210 .015
149 160 133 193 193 193 160 133
.061 .813** .636** -.137 .208** .100 1 .172*
.494 .000 .000 .065 .005 .210 .049
130 161 136 183 183 160 183 132
.107 .009 .041 -.195* .355** .210* .172* 1
.277 .921 .656 .016 .000 .015 .049
106 122 121 152 152 133 132 152
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Difference (year 5)
Aid (capitall formation)
Aid (percent of imports
and exports)
Land area
Loss in percent of
GDP (log)
Loss in percent of
Capital Stock (log)
Aid (% of GNI)
Remittances
Difference
(year 5)
Aid (capital
formation)
Aid (percent
of imports
and exports) Land area
Loss in
percent of
GDP (log)
Loss in
percent of
Capital
Stock (log) Aid (% of GNI) Remittances
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**.  
30 
 
 
Table A-1: Correlation matrix (continued) 
Correlations
1 .117 -.065 -.177* .043
.147 .428 .030 .598
155 154 150 150 155
.117 1 .833** .618** .624**
.147 .000 .000 .000
154 204 193 193 204
-.065 .833** 1 .837** .593**
.428 .000 .000 .000
150 193 199 199 199
-.177* .618** .837** 1 .368**
.030 .000 .000 .000
150 193 199 199 199
.043 .624** .593** .368** 1
.598 .000 .000 .000
155 204 199 199 220
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Difference (year 5)
Capital Stock (log)
GDP (log)
Money loss (log)
Land Area (log)
Difference
(year 5)
Capital
Stock (log) GDP (log)
Money
loss (log)
Land
Area (log)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A-2: Diff(5) vs. Income 
 
Difference (year 5)  * Income level
Difference (year 5)
19 -10.0428 10.28454 -8.2346 -.610
46 -1.5493 28.08414 1.8748 .661
90 -.1570 21.37437 -4.1126 1.075
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
Income level
high income
low income
middle income
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
 
 
Table A-3: Diff(5) vs. Debt 
 
Difference (year 5) * Indebtedness
Difference (year 5)
20 -8.5480 12.31746 -7.4272 -.033
62 -.6998 26.53054 1.7900 .629
17 1.4293 33.09615 -8.4707 1.283
56 -1.5386 16.55988 -4.8505 .396
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
Indebtedness level
NanN
highly indebted
medium indebted
less indebted
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
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Table A-4: Diff(5) vs. SIDS 
Difference (year 5)  * SIDS
Difference (year 5)
114 -1.0722 21.51452 -2.5134 1.009
41 -3.7554 26.01534 -3.9810 .944
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
SIDS
no
yes
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
 
 
Table A-5: Diff(5) vs. Hazard type 
 
Difference (year 5)  * Hazard type
Difference (year 5)
53 -3.2304 15.29672 -5.1644 1.287
41 2.5940 22.90447 3.0448 -.032
25 -3.6452 23.32322 -4.4723 .998
23 4.6507 31.28664 -5.4178 1.711
13 -17.4760 23.65540 -9.8835 -.427
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
Hazard type
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
 
 
 
Table A-6: Diff(5) vs. Income vs. Debt.  
Difference (year 5)
16 -9.8812 10.82718 -7.4272 -.679
3 -10.9044 8.45075 -11.5879 .362
19 -10.0428 10.28454 -8.2346 -.610
41 -1.1036 29.47572 3.3870 .603
5 -5.2039 12.89095 -8.1523 .716
46 -1.5493 28.08414 1.8748 .661
4 -3.2148 18.09280 -3.6352 .114
21 .0887 20.20344 .4068 .857
12 4.1931 38.78767 -10.0309 .991
53 -1.0084 16.79157 -4.5365 .331
90 -.1570 21.37437 -4.1126 1.075
20 -8.5480 12.31746 -7.4272 -.033
62 -.6998 26.53054 1.7900 .629
17 1.4293 33.09615 -8.4707 1.283
56 -1.5386 16.55988 -4.8505 .396
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
Indebtedness level
NanN
less indebted
Total
highly indebted
medium indebted
Total
NanN
highly indebted
medium indebted
less indebted
Total
NanN
highly indebted
medium indebted
less indebted
Total
Income level
high income
low income
middle income
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
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Table A-7: Diff(5) vs. Income vs. Hazard type 
Difference (year 5)  * Income level * Hazard type
Difference (year 5)
6 -9.9249 7.93491 -8.9508 -.233
3 -8.7336 7.81854 -12.3034 1.626
6 -15.3454 14.40122 -16.6655 .329
3 -4.5909 4.97845 -6.6197 1.529
1 .7820 . .7820 .
19 -10.0428 10.28454 -8.2346 -.610
14 1.4656 9.33077 4.1589 -.602
16 4.5497 28.45303 7.6761 -.186
3 -11.8533 37.53206 3.5834 -1.538
9 .8741 39.00068 -7.8058 2.163
4 -34.2222 24.94859 -41.9039 1.528
46 -1.5493 28.08414 1.8748 .661
33 -4.0054 17.78638 -6.9198 1.482
22 2.7163 19.84732 1.7985 -.168
16 2.2814 22.53234 .6409 2.057
11 10.2610 29.30183 4.9994 1.213
8 -11.3851 21.02976 -7.6592 -.918
90 -.1570 21.37437 -4.1126 1.075
53 -3.2304 15.29672 -5.1644 1.287
41 2.5940 22.90447 3.0448 -.032
25 -3.6452 23.32322 -4.4723 .998
23 4.6507 31.28664 -5.4178 1.711
13 -17.4760 23.65540 -9.8835 -.427
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
Hazard type
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Income level
high income
low income
middle income
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
 
 
 
Table A-8: Diff(5) vs. Income vs. SIDS 
Difference (year 5)  * Income level * SIDS
Difference (year 5)
16 -11.0912 10.62976 -9.9112 -.457
3 -4.4515 6.98729 -2.1327 -1.329
19 -10.0428 10.28454 -8.2346 -.610
33 1.5991 21.89418 4.9307 .033
13 -9.5415 39.78641 -5.4178 1.464
46 -1.5493 28.08414 1.8748 .661
65 .0377 22.82711 -4.2906 1.281
25 -.6632 17.44403 -3.9810 -.339
90 -.1570 21.37437 -4.1126 1.075
114 -1.0722 21.51452 -2.5134 1.009
41 -3.7554 26.01534 -3.9810 .944
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
SIDS
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
Income level
high income
low income
middle income
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
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Table A-9: Diff(5) vs. Hazard vs. SIDS 
Report
Difference (year 5)
17 -10.4743 11.15400 -8.2346 -.494
3 2.3679 15.35486 1.0816 .374
20 -8.5480 12.31746 -7.4272 -.033
42 .7537 23.01306 3.3392 .329
20 -3.7520 33.20379 -1.0841 1.013
62 -.6998 26.53054 1.7900 .629
12 6.2663 34.49705 -6.2215 1.500
5 -10.1795 29.49825 -11.5911 .481
17 1.4293 33.09615 -8.4707 1.283
43 -1.1866 17.74184 -5.4348 .300
13 -2.7030 12.38017 -3.9810 1.078
56 -1.5386 16.55988 -4.8505 .396
114 -1.0722 21.51452 -2.5134 1.009
41 -3.7554 26.01534 -3.9810 .944
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
SIDS
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
Indebtedness level
NanN
highly indebted
middle indebted
low indebted
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
 
 
Table A-10: Diff(5) vs. Debt. vs. SIDS 
Difference (year 5)
17 -10.4743 11.15400 -8.2346 -.494
3 2.3679 15.35486 1.0816 .374
20 -8.5480 12.31746 -7.4272 -.033
42 .7537 23.01306 3.3392 .329
20 -3.7520 33.20379 -1.0841 1.013
62 -.6998 26.53054 1.7900 .629
12 6.2663 34.49705 -6.2215 1.500
5 -10.1795 29.49825 -11.5911 .481
17 1.4293 33.09615 -8.4707 1.283
43 -1.1866 17.74184 -5.4348 .300
13 -2.7030 12.38017 -3.9810 1.078
56 -1.5386 16.55988 -4.8505 .396
114 -1.0722 21.51452 -2.5134 1.009
41 -3.7554 26.01534 -3.9810 .944
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
SIDS
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
no
yes
Total
Indebtedness level
NanN
highly indebted
medium indebted
less indebted
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
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Table A-11: Diff(5) vs. Debt. vs. Hazard 
Difference (year 5)
3 -8.9454 9.11666 -6.3138 -1.191
5 -6.6942 7.78935 -10.3152 .548
6 -15.3454 14.40122 -16.6655 .329
5 -3.8723 15.37481 -6.6197 .333
1 .7820 . .7820 .
20 -8.5480 12.31746 -7.4272 -.033
28 .9441 17.26948 2.6662 .951
16 4.6616 29.24047 7.6761 -.252
4 -7.9115 31.64260 3.7486 -1.811
9 2.7294 38.47571 -5.4178 2.081
5 -27.4645 26.36579 -37.2340 .369
62 -.6998 26.53054 1.7900 .629
4 -9.1192 3.59991 -10.0309 1.009
5 -7.6672 16.27240 -8.1523 .013
1 71.3230 . 71.3230 .
5 12.6623 43.04089 -12.3435 1.152
2 -17.7618 43.65925 -17.7618 .
17 1.4293 33.09615 -8.4707 1.283
18 -7.4628 12.97722 -8.3785 1.456
15 6.9051 19.91528 6.3466 -.382
14 -2.7668 13.83809 -2.2192 .650
4 9.6128 13.16919 10.9818 -.443
5 -11.0247 15.71403 -9.8835 -1.098
56 -1.5386 16.55988 -4.8505 .396
53 -3.2304 15.29672 -5.1644 1.287
41 2.5940 22.90447 3.0448 -.032
25 -3.6452 23.32322 -4.4723 .998
23 4.6507 31.28664 -5.4178 1.711
13 -17.4760 23.65540 -9.8835 -.427
155 -1.7820 22.73418 -3.4932 .951
Hazard type
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Drought
other
Total
Indebtedness level
NanN
highly indebted
medium indebted
less indebted
Total
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Skewness
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Appendix B: Linear (forward) regression: Details 
 
Table B-1: Model Summary 
 
 
Model Summary
.317a .100 .080 21.03051
.435b .189 .151 20.19663
Model
1
2
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Loss in percent of Capital Stock
(log)
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), Loss in percent of Capital Stock
(log), Remittances
b. 
 
 
Table B-2: ANOVA 
ANOVAc
2171.570 1 2171.570 4.910 .032a
19460.421 44 442.282
21631.991 45
4092.124 2 2046.062 5.016 .011b
17539.867 43 407.904
21631.991 45
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
2
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Loss in percent of Capital Stock (log)a. 
Predictors: (Constant), Loss in percent of Capital Stock (log), Remittancesb. 
Dependent Variable: Difference (year 5)c. 
 
 
Table B-3: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa
3.254 3.247 1.002 .322
-4.600 2.076 -.317 -2.216 .032
-3.095 4.276 -.724 .473
-5.934 2.086 -.409 -2.844 .007
1.946 .897 .312 2.170 .036
(Constant)
Loss in percent of
Capital Stock (log)
(Constant)
Loss in percent of
Capital Stock (log)
Remittances
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Difference (year 5)a. 
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 Table B-4: Excluded Variables 
 
Excluded Variablesc
-.163a -.807 .424 -.122 .506
-.131a -.878 .385 -.133 .916
-.116a -.807 .424 -.122 1.000
-.221a -1.332 .190 -.199 .728
.312a 2.170 .036 .314 .913
-.083a -.570 .572 -.087 .983
.043
a
.211 .834 .032 .512
.047a .319 .751 .049 .968
.102
a
.696 .490 .105 .954
.011
a
.075 .940 .011 .908
-.123b -.629 .533 -.097 .501
-.100b -.688 .495 -.106 .906
-.087b -.629 .533 -.097 .990
-.070b -.376 .709 -.058 .561
-.027b -.187 .853 -.029 .948
.034
b
.177 .861 .027 .512
.108b .756 .454 .116 .933
.169
b
1.183 .243 .180 .918
-.049
b
-.330 .743 -.051 .876
Capital Stock (log)
GDP (log)
Money loss (log)
Land Area (log)
Remittances
Aid (% of GNI)
Loss in percent of
GDP (log)
Aid (capital formation)
Aid (percent of
imports and exports)
Literacy rate (percent
of adult)
Capital Stock (log)
GDP (log)
Money loss (log)
Land Area (log)
Aid (% of GNI)
Loss in percent of
GDP (log)
Aid (capital formation)
Aid (percent of
imports and exports)
Literacy rate (percent
of adult)
Model
1
2
Beta In t Sig.
Partial
Correlation Tolerance
Collinearity
Statistics
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Loss in percent of Capital Stock (log)a. 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Loss in percent of Capital Stock (log), Remittancesb. 
Dependent Variable: Difference (year 5)c. 
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Appendix C: General Linear Regression 
 
Table C-1: Between-Subject factors 
 
 
Name [abbreviation] 
 
 
Value Label 
 
N 
 
Income [I_Income] 
high income 19 
middle income 96 
low income 46 
 
Indebtedness [debt] 
Nan 20 
less indebted 59 
medium indebted 18 
highly indebted 62 
 
SIDS [I_SIDS] 
Yes 41 
No 118 
 
 
Hazard [I_Hazard] 
Storm 55 
Flood 41 
Earthquake 26 
Drought 24 
Other 13 
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Table C-2: Tests of between-Subject factors 
Dependent Variable: Difference (year 5)
21220a 40 531 6.446 .023
1337 1 1337 16.243 .010
244 1 244 2.969 .145
13 1 13 .162 .704
764 1 764 9.284 .029
1802 1 1802 21.888 .005
2230 1 2230 27.093 .003
1849 1 1849 22.467 .005
20 1 20 .238 .646
80 1 80 .971 .370
0 1 0 .003 .956
4108 2 2054 24.959 .003
1 1 1 .008 .931
97 1 97 1.174 .328
965 1 965 11.723 .019
653 1 653 7.932 .037
4155 8 519 6.310 .029
369 1 369 4.483 .088
106 1 106 1.291 .307
245 3 82 .991 .468
727 2 364 4.418 .079
698 1 698 8.475 .033
5 1 5 .063 .812
1805 4 451 5.482 .045
82 1 82 .998 .364
140 1 140 1.706 .248
63 2 31 .381 .702
0 0 . . .
0 0 . . .
0 0 . . .
412 5 82
22969 46
21632 45
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Literacy rate
Aid (capital formation)
Aid (percent of import and exports)
Capital Stock loss (log) [logCapLoss]
Aid (percent of GNI)
Remittances [Remit]
Capital Stock (log)
GDP (log)
Land Area (log)
I_debt * Remit
I_Income * Remit
I_SIDS * Remit
I_debt * I_Income * Remit
I_debt * I_SIDS * Remit
I_debt * I_Hazard * Remit
I_Income * I_SIDS * Remit
I_Income * I_Hazard * Remit
I_SIDS * I_Hazard * Remit
I_debt * logCapLoss
I_Income * logCapLoss
I_SIDS * logCapLoss
I_Hazard * logCapLoss
I_debt * I_Income * logCapLoss
I_debt * I_SIDS * logCapLoss
I_debt * I_Hazard * logCapLoss
I_Income * I_SIDS * logCapLoss
I_Income * I_Hazard * logCapLoss
I_SIDS * I_Hazard * logCapLoss
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type I Sum of
Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig.
R Squared = .981 (Adjusted R Squared = .829)a. 
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Table C-3: Parameter estimates 
Parameter Estimates
Dependent Variable: Diference (year 5)
65.048 82.020 .793 .464 -145.791 275.886
-.394 .362 -1.088 .326 -1.324 .537
-.192 .242 -.796 .462 -.813 .429
.391 .424 .923 .398 -.698 1.479
-21.650 229.545 -.094 .929 -611.715 568.414
-.297 .959 -.309 .770 -2.762 2.169
-16.487 194.754 -.085 .936 -517.120 484.145
2.950 6.885 .428 .686 -14.749 20.649
-11.146 7.886 -1.414 .217 -31.417 9.124
11.320 4.287 2.640 .046 .299 22.340
273.337 372.066 .735 .496 -683.088 1229.762
122.872 232.243 .529 .619 -474.127 719.872
0 . . . . .
-245.669 506.327 -.485 .648 -1547.223 1055.886
0 . . . . .
24.322 202.097 .120 .909 -495.183 543.828
0 . . . . .
-65.834 125.906 -.523 .623 -389.487 257.818
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
-163.417 473.051 -.345 .744 -1379.433 1052.599
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
-271.442 380.054 -.714 .507 -1248.401 705.517
55.542 65.961 .842 .438 -114.015 225.099
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
-32.420 143.687 -.226 .830 -401.780 336.940
-130.722 238.276 -.549 .607 -743.229 481.786
0 . . . . .
12.886 544.168 .024 .982 -1385.943 1411.715
55.172 190.856 .289 .784 -435.439 545.784
-5.385 7.599 -.709 .510 -24.919 14.149
103.618 228.818 .453 .670 -484.576 691.812
0 . . . . .
306.871 481.720 .637 .552 -931.429 1545.171
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
178.903 159.026 1.125 .312 -229.887 587.692
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
-16.443 550.186 -.030 .977 -1430.741 1397.855
-168.587 197.815 -.852 .433 -677.087 339.913
0 . . . . .
-113.086 237.732 -.476 .654 -724.195 498.024
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
-89.034 114.835 -.775 .473 -384.226 206.159
-74.571 32.945 -2.264 .073 -159.258 10.116
0 . . . . .
59.254 34.853 1.700 .150 -30.339 148.848
0 . . . . .
-137.896 79.075 -1.744 .142 -341.166 65.373
0 . . . . .
137.943 193.275 .714 .507 -358.886 634.772
153.894 202.842 .759 .482 -367.529 675.317
161.206 199.402 .808 .456 -351.375 673.786
160.106 202.766 .790 .466 -361.121 681.334
0 . . . . .
-48.924 42.237 -1.158 .299 -157.498 59.649
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
114.522 102.978 1.112 .317 -150.192 379.235
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
0 . . . . .
-20.244 40.697 -.497 .640 -124.860 84.371
-26.591 33.445 -.795 .463 -112.564 59.382
Parameter
Intercept
Literacy
Aidgcf
Aidimex
logCapLoss
AidGNI
Remit
logCapStock
logGDP
logLandArea
[I_debt=1.00] * Remit
[I_debt=2.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * Remit
[I_Income=76.00] * Remit
[I_Income=77.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=1.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Income=76.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Income=77.00] * Remit
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_Income=76.00] * Remit
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_Income=77.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_Income=77.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_SIDS=.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_SIDS=1.00] * Remit
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_SIDS=.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_SIDS=.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_SIDS=1.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Hazard=1.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Hazard=2.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Hazard=4.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Hazard=5.00] * Remit
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_Hazard=2.00] * Remit
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_Hazard=3.00] * Remit
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_Hazard=4.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_Hazard=1.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_Hazard=2.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_Hazard=3.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_Hazard=4.00] * Remit
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_Hazard=5.00] * Remit
[I_Income=76.00] * [I_SIDS=.00] * Remit
[I_Income=76.00] * [I_SIDS=1.00] * Remit
[I_Income=77.00] * [I_SIDS=.00] * Remit
[I_Income=77.00] * [I_SIDS=1.00] * Remit
[I_Income=76.00] * [I_Hazard=1.00] * Remit
[I_Income=76.00] * [I_Hazard=2.00] * Remit
[I_Income=76.00] * [I_Hazard=4.00] * Remit
[I_Income=77.00] * [I_Hazard=1.00] * Remit
[I_Income=77.00] * [I_Hazard=2.00] * Remit
[I_Income=77.00] * [I_Hazard=3.00] * Remit
[I_Income=77.00] * [I_Hazard=4.00] * Remit
[I_Income=77.00] * [I_Hazard=5.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=.00] * [I_Hazard=1.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=.00] * [I_Hazard=2.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=.00] * [I_Hazard=3.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=.00] * [I_Hazard=4.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=.00] * [I_Hazard=5.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=1.00] * [I_Hazard=1.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=1.00] * [I_Hazard=2.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=1.00] * [I_Hazard=4.00] * Remit
[I_SIDS=1.00] * [I_Hazard=5.00] * Remit
[I_debt=1.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=2.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=3.00] * logCapLoss
[I_Income=76.00] * logCapLoss
[I_Income=77.00] * logCapLoss
[I_SIDS=.00] * logCapLoss
[I_SIDS=1.00] * logCapLoss
[I_Hazard=1.00] * logCapLoss
[I_Hazard=2.00] * logCapLoss
[I_Hazard=3.00] * logCapLoss
[I_Hazard=4.00] * logCapLoss
[I_Hazard=5.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Income=76.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Income=77.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_Income=76.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_Income=77.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_Income=77.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_SIDS=.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_SIDS=1.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=2.00] * [I_SIDS=.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_SIDS=.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=3.00] * [I_SIDS=1.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Hazard=1.00] * logCapLoss
[I_debt=1.00] * [I_Hazard=2.00] * logCapLoss
B Std. Error t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
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Appendix D:  Uncertainty analysis 
 
To assess the uncertainty in the projections based on the ARIMA models, 95% forecast 
confidence intervals were calculated. For each observation in the sample, we calculated 
the 95% forecast confidence intervals and used the upper and lower bounds for 
comparison with the observed GDP data; i.e., we calculate the differences to observed 
data based on these two values. Hence, there are two additional samples: one on the 
upper and one on the lower confidence region. The mean and median for these two 
samples are shown in table D1.  
 
Table D1: Mean and median of the sample differences using either the lower bound projections or 
the upper bound projections of the 95 percent forecast confidence intervals. 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
 low       up low       up low       up low       up low       up 
Mean  -11.09       6.97  -22.95     14.18 -37.94     20.95 -56.15     27.06 -80.47     33.02 
Median -9.14         5.86 -19.10    13.10 -31.10     20.31 -44.95     27.79 -59.29     34.15 
 
A large range can be found for the differences in the post-disaster years according to 
these 95 percent upper and lower confidence intervals of the projections; yet there is a 
clear trend to negative differences. The test for the lower and upper confidence bounds of 
the projections are however not useful for interpretational purposes due to the high 
standard errors associated with mean projections, leading either to a full rejection of the 
Null hypothesis or not.  
One remaining question regarding the ARIMA model projections and the validity of 
the results above is the influence of multiple disaster events. We tackle this issue by 
looking at a sub-sample within the full sample where 5 years before and 5 years after the 
disaster event no other major disaster (with losses higher than 1 percent of GDP) 
occurred. Table D2 again shows the mean and median as well as the sample size. 
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Table D2: Summary results for differences of real and projected GDP levels for sub-sample 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Mean -2.0558 -3.0284 -4.1281 -5.2683 -7.0973 
Median -.8355 -1.4487 -2.0793 -3.5084 -5.9910 
Std. Dev. 7.75618 12.15134 17.14314 23.01776 30.86930 
Skewness -1.721 -1.764 -2.201 -3.200 -4.172 
Observations 136 129 128 123 120 
 
As in the full sample case, the average values are all negative, even with higher negative 
values. Statistical non-parametric Wilcoxon tests reveal that all of the average results are 
significantly lower than zero on the 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
  
